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Every country claims that it possesses a unique geography and Turkey is certainly no 
exception. There are, however, some specific reasons behind Turkey’s claim to uniqueness. Is 
Turkey in Europe or Asia? Is it part of the Islamic or Western world? Should it pursue policies to 
become a member of the European Union or should it turn back to its Ottoman heritage? The 
answers to these questions are contested and uncertainty about Turkey’s identity and its place in 
the European state-system is pervasive. Turkey’s unique geography has been shaping its 
historical role and relative political importance in international relations.1 Turkey has borders 
with Bulgaria and Greece in the Balkans; Iran, Iraq and Syria in the Middle East; and the new 
republics of the former Soviet Union, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia in the Caucasus. Turkey 
is a peninsula surrounded by the Mediterranean Sea, the Black Sea and the Aegean Sea. It has 
historical and cultural connections with the Balkans, the Caucasus and the Middle East. This 
location has played a determining role in its strategic importance international relations. 
After the end of the Cold War, and especially since the 11 September 2001 terrorist 
attacks against the United States of America, Turkey’s importance gained a new dimension in 
terms of mediating between Islamic and Western values. 
I am going to begin by challenging three dominating discourses of Turkey’s relations with 
Europe during and after the cold war. 
1. It is not a bridge between Europe and Asia, because it is a Eurasian country. “In 
geopraphical, political and cultural terms, Turkey rests along an axis where [Europe 
and Asia] blend.”2 Both Russia and Turkey share similar historical and geographical 
dimensions. Turkey is close to Central Asia and there is nothing wrong with having 
Asian values and identities.  
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2. It is not a country torn between Islam and the West as Samuel Huntington argues in 
The Clash of Civilisations, (Article in 1993, Book in 1996 - “The fault lines between 
civilisations will be the battle lines of the future.”) On the contrary, Turkey is a 
historically and culturally rich country with a unique sociological experience. 
3. It is not a state of pivotal importance for US strategy - as Paul Kennedy and other 
American scholars might hope (Article in 1996, Book in 1999 - “It is vital that 
America focus its efforts on a small number of countries whose fate is uncertain and 
whose future will profoundly affect their surrounding regions. These are the pivotal 
states. The classic example of a pivotal state throughout the nineteenth century was 
Turkey, the epicentre of the so-called Eastern Question; because of Turkey’s strategic 
position, the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire posed a perennial problem for 
British and Russian policymakers.” According to these American scholars the other 
pivotal states are, Algeria, Egypt, South Africa, India, Pakistan, Indonesia Mexico and 
Brazil.) 
Instead, Turkey is a middle power, which has to realise it is capable of bringing 
Europe, Mediterranean the Middle East regions and the Caucasus together for its own 
national interests.  
To begin with, the point of departure in my paper is that, Turkey and the Ottoman Empire 
are not the same entities. The identity of the state was the Ottoman Empire and Turkey.  From 
Turkish scholars perspective, Turkey refers only to the contemporary Turkish Republic, not the 
Ottoman Empire. Secondly, modern Turkish state-builders inherited an ‘identity crisis’ from their 
predecessors, and they sought to solve this crisis through the construction of a secular nation-state 
on the basis of European model - hoping that Turkey would become an equal member of 
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European international society, unlike the Ottoman Empire. The question arises at this juncture: 
did they succeed? Why are there problems in Turkish-European relations?  
In order to answer these questions we have to understand three important factors in 
Turkish-European relations: (1) The European identity was defined against the Ottoman Empire, 
as ‘the other’. (2) Turkey is located at the margins of Europe, which makes its geopolitics 
problematic. (3) The Turkish-European relations are based on the politics of exclusion and 
misperceptions. 
 
1. The ‘otherness’ of the Ottoman Empire in European International Society 
“Like national or ethnic identity, European identity is an historically constructed, 
historically variable, historically moulded chosen collective identity.”3 In this context, I argue 
that European identity, like any other collective identity, developed itself in relation to the 
existence of the ‘other.’ Accordingly, the Ottoman Empire was one of the ‘others’ until the 
nineteenth century, like China and Japan.  
One can argue that the Ottoman Empire was, empirically, a European state. However, 
“[t]he paradox is that it was not. Even though a significant portion of the Empire was based in 
Europe, it cannot be said to have been of Europe.”4 According to Holbraad, the Ottoman Empire 
was never really part of international society since it was “geographically marginal, culturally 
alien and historically hostile.”5 The Ottoman Empire had a different socio-political organisation - 
its millet system, and a different religion than European states. For the West, the Ottoman Empire 
was an alien ‘other’, a non-Western alien society, which had different principles of existence and 
values from those of Europe.6 The Ottoman Empire was never accepted as a great Western 
power, indeed it was never regarded as Western by European powers. This caused the dilemma of 
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being part of a European international system but not being member of European international 
society.7 It wasn’t until the late fifteenth century that the Empire began to get involved in 
Europe’s affairs.  It was then that Turkey was drawn into alliances with Western powers in order 
to help the Italian city-states against their enemies.8 The Ottoman Empire was the only state 
which did not ‘know its place’ in the hierarchy of European powers. Although it had extensive 
possessions in the Balkans and the Treaty of Paris of 1856 formally admitted it to the Concert of 
Europe, it was never regarded as a European state.9 Being a formal part of the Western system in 
1856 did not mean that it was an active member as well.  
 Most analyses of the Ottoman Empire’s status in international society are generally 
presented from the perspective of both Western states and Western scholars. The result is that the 
Ottoman Empire was not regarded as a European state. But there is another side of the coin as 
well: the rulers of the Empire did not want to be a member of the international society of 
European states, particularly at the height of its power. Its self-identity was that of the ‘protector’ 
of the Muslim world against the ‘infidel’ Christian world. Arguably, the Ottoman sultans 
considered themselves superior to their Western counterparts and chose to exclude the Empire 
from the European society of states. Although the Ottoman Empire accepted Western 
ambassadors to Istanbul at certain times for limited periods, Ottoman ambassadors were not sent 
to Western states until the eighteenth century, demonstrating that they did not understand such 
exchanges to be reciprocal. However, as a consequence of the decline of the Empire, its policies 
had to be changed in order to gain Western allies. When the Ottoman Empire was drawn into the 
politics of European states and reluctantly decided to become a member of international society, 
it was not easy for either European states or the Ottoman Empire to define the Empire’s identity 
and place within this society. Despite the fact that many Western scholars regard the relationship 
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between the European states and the Ottoman Empire as the longest and most equal of all 
European relations with external actors, they fail to acknowledge the fact that European identity 
developed in relation to the existence of the Ottoman Empire as the dangerous ‘other.’10 As 
Martin Wight point out “the politics of the defence of Europe against the Turks were religious 
politics. ... The rulers of the West regarded the Turks with fear and disgust, as a barbarian 
intruder, and revived the idea of a crusade to deliver the Balkans and the Near East from the 
infidel.”11 From the Ottoman point of view, the West was also the ‘other’ (kafir –infidel) in terms 
of its religion and different socio-political structure. However, to use religion to explain the 
Turkish identity crisis might be an oversimplification, which bears the danger of taking us to the 
Clash of Civilisations argument. 
 
2. The problematic nature of Turkey’s geographical location  
In addition to religion, I argue that history and geopolitics play an important role in the 
political identities of all countries.12 One of the determining factors of this ambiguous status and 
identity crisis is its existence in between regions. The Ottoman Empire extended to 3 different 
continents: Europe, Asia and Africa. The modern Turkish state also inherited this multi-faceted 
geography. Turkey has historical and cultural connections with the 3 different regions: the 
Balkans, the Caucasus and the Middle East. This location creates anxieties about not belonging to 
a region. Thus, its geographical location, which cannot be placed “into any of the neat 
geographical categories,” also creates problems for its relations with Europe: it is a European 
country as well as a Middle Eastern and Mediterranean one.13 Turkey is located at the crossroads 
of international politics and in an area of the world where Eastern and Western ways of life and 
interests overlap.14 This external environment has helped shape the country’s identity. Turkey’s 
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unusual problem has been that Turkey does not belong to a region, because it is between regions. 
It is close to having a European identity, but there is no cultural link between Turkey and the 
Western states. Similarly, although located in the Middle East, it does not have cultural links with 
this region’s peoples either.  
Therefore, Turkey’s socio-cultural differences from the West and its neighbouring states 
contribute to its otherness in different regions. It is geographically in the Middle East but it does 
not share the same social or economic background or cultural identity with the regional states. 15 
Historically, There is “a deep sense of inferiority and bitterness” among the Arab states towards 
Turkey because of Ottoman rule.16 Economically, Turkey is not an oil-rich country like most 
other Middle Eastern states. Socially, it is much more secularised and Westernised, and it is 
linguistically different from the Arab states. In fact, from a cultural identity perspective, 
especially in terms of language, the Central Asian region shares more common features with 
Turkey than with the Middle East. However, while Turkey does have share identity with the ex-
communist states in the Balkans and the Caucasus, it does not belong to these regions either. 
Turkey has always been regarded as belonging to the ‘other’ in these regions. 
 Thus, its geographical location contributes to its paradoxical relations with Europe. A 
very brief summary of Anthony Giddens’ classification of nation-states is helpful for 
understanding the role of geopolitics from a different perspective. Giddens lists four different 
types of nation-states: classical, colonised, post-colonial, and modernising.17 I thought he would 
place Turkey in modernising group, but he considers Turkey to be a Classical nation-state, which 
refers to mainly the European states originating in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. 
Giddens argues that “[n]ot all nation-states that can be placed in the classical type were 
established in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Those set up in Europe and around the 
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margins of Europe following the World Wars (including ex-imperial states like Austria or 
Turkey) belong in this category.”18 Thus the main reason for considering Turkey among the 
classical nation-states is its geographical closeness to Europe, ‘around the margins of Europe’, as 
Giddens describes it. This is also a key factor in creating an ‘identity crisis’ for Turkey. With the 
Treaty of Paris in 1856 the Ottoman Empire had been accepted into the European system without 
being part of it, and it seems that the new Turkish Republic inherited this historically ambiguous 
status. More importantly, Turkish-European relations are based on misperceptions, which the 
third factor of my analysis. 
 
3. The politics of exclusion and misperception between Turkey and European states 
The Ottoman Empire had refused to take part in European international society and to 
observe European international law until it was in decline in the nineteenth century. When the 
Empire was inducted into European international society in 1856 it was no longer in a position to 
enforce its own Islamic rules in external relations.19 On the contrary, the Empire had to accept the 
requirements of international society like other major European states. After 1856, legitimacy of 
the Ottoman Empire’s membership in European international society depended on changing its 
anachronistic Islamic character in order both to survive and to be part of European society. There 
had been three important requirements of being a member of this society: a) to prove the secular 
character of the state; b) to accept modern arguments on the principle of nationality, or of 
national self-determination; c) to observe European international law. Therfore, the 
transformation of the Ottoman socio-political structure to the European model of secular nation-
state was an answer to the state’s ‘identity crisis,’ which itself was a consequence of the Ottoman 
 8
Empire’s integration into European international society in the nineteenth century. The 
movements of the Young Ottomans and the Young Turks were, in fact, different responses to the 
‘identity crisis’ of the Ottoman state and to the modernisation of the Empire. Their proposed 
ideologies, pan-Ottomanism, pan-Islamism, and pan-Turkism, did not in themselves provide an 
answer to modernise the state in accordance with the European norms.  
 In the course of Turkey’s relations with the European states in the twentieth century, one 
can argue that the Turkish Republic has not diverged much from the Ottoman Empire’s status 
since the seventeenth century. Turkey still wants to overcome its ‘otherness’ in the society of the 
European states and be accepted as an equal member of this society as their predecessors aimed 
centuries ago. When a peace treaty between the Ottoman Empire and the Holy League was 
signed at Carlowitz in 1699, as the first peace signed by a defeated Ottoman Empire with 
victorious Christian powers its implication was very clear: the Ottomans had to learn new 
concepts and new ways of dealing with the European states, i.e. a new understanding of 
diplomacy, mediation and international law.20 Interestingly enough, exactly three-hundred-years 
later when the European Union nominated Turkey as an official candidate for membership in the 
Helsinki Summit of 1999, some Turkish politicians and newspaper commentaries declared it the 
most important event in the history of Turkish Republic. When the European Union laid out the 
conditions under which Turkey could become a member of the club, this sense of self-
congratulation disappeared. Suggestions such as granting all citizens the equal right to cultural 
expression and practice their religion, repeal limits on free speech and expression of ideas, 
resolve social conflicts by conciliation, and limit the power of the military in government and 
society were some of the conditions that could not be acceptable by Turkish authorities.21 From 
Turkey’s perspective, whatever Turks and Turkey do we cannot satisfy the requirements of 
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European international society. From European states’ perspective, Turkey cannot fulfill the 
expectations of western world. 
 European perceptions of Turkey have always focused on two important issues: democracy 
and the role of military. The first misperception is that Europe does not want to acknowledge that 
“Turkey has a long history of democracy, stretching back to the first Ottoman Parliament of 
1877/78. Democracy emerged, if fitfully, after the Young Turk revolution of 1908 against the 
autocracy of the Sultan Abdul Hamid’s regime. It was re-established, if in theory more than in 
fact, in 1923.”22 As we all know, the EU Commission Reports after 1999 always conclude that, 
‘Though it is beginning to make progress in some areas, Turkey does not yet meet the 
Copenhagen political criteria.’ The European Parliament covers the same ground as the 
Commission, but has hardly a good word to say for Turkey’s efforts so far [without going into 
the details of the pointed criticisms they can be summarised on the following major issues: 
human rights, the place of the National Security Council in Turkish politics, the Kurdish issue, 
non-compliance with judgements of the European Court of Human rights etc, the list goes on]. 
Turkey has to make serious efforts to convince Europe that it has some experience with 
democracy despite its problems. I am not arguing that Turkey is a fully-fledged democracy but 
historically it does have some experience of democracy compared to other Muslim countries. The 
European Parliament is not, perhaps, fully aware that every liberal democracy has its problems, 
including those in the EU, but Turkey would certainly seem to have more than most. They should 
not forget the fact that Turkey has nevertheless managed to maintain a fair degree of democracy 
through a period of rapid socio-political and economic change. The second misperception is 
related to the role of military in Turkey. The role of army is easy to understand for Turks as the 
guardians of democracy. But it is very difficult to explain to Europeans. The European 
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experience does not have any notion of a democratic state, which can be saved by the military. In 
Europe, the military generally accepted that it has at best only a marginal role to play in politics.” 
But the Turkish modern state-builders were soldiers, and Turkish democracy has been corrected 
by military coups. Thus, for Europeans it is very difficult to understand the role of military in 
Turkey.23  
Turkey’s perception of Europe is also problematic. On the one hand, Turks believe that 
the EU is a Christian Club and whatever they do it is not good enough to be a member. European 
states have not appreciated Turkey’s unique experience as a modernizing secular ‘European’ 
country despite its different socio-cultural identity and religion. From Turkey’s perspective, its 
commitment to Europe for the last two centuries faced with criticism, deeply-rooted hostility and 
exclusion. The second misperception is what I call is Sevres syndrome in Turkish politics and 
history. At the end of the First World War, the policies of the Allies against the Turkish people 
created a distrust towards the West. Turkish leaders became very sensitive about sovereignty in 
the early years of the Turkish Republic. This sensitivity has influenced Turkish politicians in 
their protection of Turkey’s territorial integrity ever since. The Turks have never forgotten that 
the Allies wanted to create independent Armenian and Kurdish states in Anatolia. As a result of 
this misperception, every time the West interfered in the Kurdish or Armenian questions the 
Turks feel they are being haunted by the shadow of the Treaty of Sèvres, which was signed 
between the Ottoman Empire and the Allies in 1920. For example, in 1995, when the media was 
preoccupied with the Kurdish question because of the events in northern Iraq, the comment of the 
Turkish president, Süleyman Demirel, was that ‘the West wanted to implement the Treaty of 
Sèvres’.24 
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Concluding Remarks 
Both sides have to overcome with their misperceptions and distrust towards the each other, and to 
understand the new dynamics of globalisation and regionalism. 
For Turkey, The reconciliation with its own history, region and identity is necessary. Turkey has 
to redefine its identity as a Eurasian and Euro-Mediterranean country as well as Middle 
Eastern.25 As a matter of identity and interests, Turkey has to have a more orientation between 
East and West. As a Muslim country, Turkey has to ensure that the war on terrorism after 9/11 
does not become a ‘civilizational’ struggle between Islam and West. As a European country, 
Turkey should carefully consider its interest in supporting US-led actions in the Middle East with 
its own and European counterparts’ interests.  
For Europe, If the EU wants to puruse an active policy towards the Middle East it needs 
Turkey’s assistance in understanding the Muslim societies of this region. “Oil supplies and 
markets for its products are the key elements in Europe’s relationship with the Middle East. Both 
of these depend on stability in the region, which is one of the reasons that the EU has committed 
substantial sums in assistance, in particular to support the peace process between Israel and the 
Palestinians.” The EU itself knows that it has a very important and economic role to play in the 
Middle East, but not a very influential political one, which can be implemented by Turkey.  
In sum, this requires the inclusion of Turkey and the task of re-defining European 
identity. When Turkey’s candidacy for membership was finally confirmed after a process of 36 
years the Eurocrats’ minds were not clear about Turkey. “The idea that the EU cannot admit a 
Muslim country to its ranks may still form part of the semi hidden agenda of many Western 
European politicians and have some effect on public opinion. Even among themselves, Western 
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Europeans are quite divided on what sort of identity they want for the EU. Should it be a full 
political union, with a stronger degree of implied cultural homogeneity, or a looser group 
restricted primarily to the economic sphere? This debate within the EU has great relevance to the 
future of its relations with Turkey.”26  
Europe has to continue to appreciate Turkey’s difference, as it did in the last Eurovision contest. 
But, Turkey has also to understand that ‘Euro-vision’ is indeed a contest but not only in signing!  
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